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WATER IN JERUSALEM AT THE END OF THE OTTOMAN PERIOD 
(1850-1920) 
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL NETWORKS1 
 
 
In the foreword to a report written at the end of the 1880s, the Ottoman 
engineer Franghia Bey stresses that "the suffering of the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem, the main cause of which is the lack of water, has made public 
opinion rank water supply highest among all the issues which involve the 
Holy City for more than ten years; as the days go by, the need becomes 
more pressing, more urgent."2 From its source in the nearby Gihon which 
supplied the city at its beginnings, to the distant Golan plateau which 
today acts as a vast water tower for "greater Jerusalem", the issue of 
water has always been a source of collective anxiety and permanent 
conflicts. Even when attempting to view it as political history, it is clear 
that the problem of water in Jerusalem is far from being solely the efficient 
and proven mark of urban administrations. Here more than elsewhere, it is 
a vital necessity connected to the topography of a city perched on the 
summit of the desert mountains of Judea, a capital which is above all a 
political and religious capital that has seemingly defied the basic laws of 
geography forever.3 
The water supply has thus always been a clearly identified subset of 
the monumental historiography of Jerusalem. Generations of scholars more 
or less familiar with the science of hydraulics, from the crusader monk to 
the colonial engineer, have elaborated a detailed cartography, which 
presently provides a fairly accurate view of the successive systems of supply 
                                                       
1  The illustrations appear in the French text. 
2 Historical Archives of the Jerusalem Municipality (HAJM) Folio: Water 
Supply (WS), c. 614, “Rapport sur l’adduction des eaux d’Arroub”, G. Franghia, 
1908, p.5. 
3 This article is part of an international research program "Réseaux techniques 
et réseaux de pouvoirs", directed by Denis Bocquet (EFR) and Samuel Fettah 
(MMSH) financed jointly by the MMSH (Maison Méditerranéenne des Sciences 
de l'Homme, Aix en Provence) and the EFR (Ecole Française de Rome), 
presented in September 2000 in Berlin at the annual EAUH  (European 
Association of Urban Historians) congress. 
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and evacuation of the waters of Jerusalem.4 The reason is obvious: 
Jerusalem is unquestionably a parched city, and there are extensive 
archeological surveys on its inner workings of underground pipelines. 
However, this purely technical history does not exhaust the issues 
prompting renewed concern today, of a history of techniques, which is 
proving itself to be a new and revitalizing contribution to the overall history 
of the political, economic and social dimensions of urban history. The 
analysis of the complex territorial strategies which have guided and 
oriented technical water supply projects appears to offer a convincing 
perspective to go beyond the traditional- from the top - view of urban 
conflicts in Jerusalem. This reversal of perspective, which switches analysis 
to the ground level, can itself shake up the religious, essentialist and 
community-focused reading which has dominated the historiography of the 
city for centuries. 
Such an analysis of technical networks in terms of their political 
dimension requires a description of the context for this study, set at the 
end of Ottoman rule, at the time when the Empire made a certain number 
of structural reforms, known as tanzimât.5 The issue of the real or 
presumed impact of these tanzimât alone occupies a whole facet of 
Ottoman historiography. One of the challenges of this study on the 
technical networks of Jerusalem is hence to make a new contribution to 
this discussion. Are these reforms the last gasp of the 'sick man' or rather a 
truly modern initiative? Although most studies have used the traditional, 
high politics approach, examining the upper echelons of the centralized 
power of the Sublime Gate, and the efficiency of administration in the 
Empire, I suggest testing these reforms on the concrete level of "low 
politics" - in a province, and under the paving stones. This approach is 
based on a field study, and the analysis of the municipal archives of 
Jerusalem, which shed light on the various levels of skill, and the various 
loci of power, and help follow the sinuous path of an emergent municipal 
policy. 
The tanzimât took place in Jerusalem against the backdrop of the 
brusque arrival of western powers on the scene, characterized by a well-
documented topographic and architectural rivalry. Each power chose its 
hill, built its neighborhood, rang its bells and raised its flags. But this 
belfry belligerence in the Holy Land was also affected, in a more subtle 
way, by the competition among engineers for the mastery of the technical 
                                                       
4 On this topic, see the helpful overview by Purvis, James D., Jerusalem the 
Holy City: A Bibliography, vol.II, Metuchen, N.J. and London, 1991, p. 53-57, 
water supply. 
5 See for example the chapter by Dumont, Paul, in Mantran, Robert (ed) 
Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1989, p.459 -522. 
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networks. This involved supplying water to Jerusalem or having water 
supplied, or contributing financially to a project or even printing the 
technical report which was awarded the contract. For the European powers 
and for the religious institutions which were often their Trojan horses this 
was durable territorial claim-making on the physical, political and symbolic 
levels. Among the players in this contest were, in addition to the western 
powers as such, the religious institutions (who owned several public pools), 
private clans (who controlled most of the cisterns), Zionist organizations 
and financial networks. The sharp rise in Jewish immigration at the turn 
of the century and the exponential increase in the need for water which 
resulted from this transformed the Zionist banks and enterprises into key 
players in what was rapidly becoming a real market. To analyze this 
technical competition as political rivalry, I have consulted the diplomatic 
and consular sources and the collection of documents preserved in the 
Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. 
This specific context at the end of the Ottoman reign should not 
outweigh the impact of time or the importance of real or fantasized 
holdings in the water infrastructure of Jerusalem. Historical sources refer 
continuously to the lost golden age of Solomon's aqueduct, Sultan's Pool or 
the miracle of the Probatical Pool, thus underscoring the importance of re-
use and symbolic re-investment which traverse the eminently political 
history of water in Jerusalem. This chronological viscosity alone serves to 
account for the territorial extent of the stakes, i.e. it provides a glimpse into 
what Maurice Halbwachs called the "Topographie légendaire des Lieux 
Saints."  A careful re-reading of travelogues and excavation reports, which 
seem to be far our chronological framework, should not be neglected. 
 
I.The traditional supply networks: when archeology goes back to 
the source 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, domestic water supply was 
provided by a certain number of complex supply networks, which varied as 
a function of the area of the city, the altitude, and the uses of water 
(domestic hygiene or consumption of drinking water), and the seasons. An 
unstable equilibrium served to satisfy most needs, even though crises were 
frequent. This equilibrium was generated by a relative stability of the 
population, both quantitatively and qualitatively, but this 'traditional era' 
was nevertheless not one of harmony. A typological analysis of the various 
systems of traditional water supply shows three fault lines within the 
urban Jerusalem society: competition between communities for autonomy 
and control over water reserves, competition between the city and the 
surrounding countryside for rural springs, and conflicts between public and 
private players over cisterns. These three fault lines provide the necessary 
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background to understand the context of scholarly debates, which enlist 
archeology to delimit city authority. 
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a.Domestic cisterns 
Designed to collect and store rain water, private cisterns were found in 
almost all the homes in the city. Field counts and reports from travelogues 
provide ample proof. In fact they show that these cisterns covered the basic 
water needs for domestic hygiene, which was estimated depending on the 
sources at about 30 liters per person per day (i.e. 300 m3 per day for a 
population of 10,000 inhabitants in 1850). The engineer E. Pierotti, in his 
exploration of Jerusalem published in 1864, counted 992 private cisterns 
in the city.6 In the early 1920s, the Mandate engineers counted 7300. 
Although the accuracy of these figures may be questioned, this seven-fold 
increase in the number of cisterns in fifty years matches the increase in the 
urban population of Jerusalem. This arithmetical index can be confirmed 
by a legal source: E.W.G. Masterman, in a treatise on the hygienic 
conditions in Jerusalem, mentions an Ottoman law which restricted 
granting of a building permit to the presence of a cistern on the roof or in 
the basement of the future building.7 These dovetailing indices indicate 
that the response to the problem of water in Jerusalem was primarily 
private. The only resource which changed significantly in quantitative 
terms between 1850 and 1920 was clearly the number of private cisterns; 
it enabled a flexible response to the increase in the population. Whereas 
the morphology of a city says something about its social structure, this 
pervasive presence of private cisterns paints the picture of an Arab 
Jerusalem, according to the criteria suggested by Dominique Chevallier, in 
L'espace social de la ville arabe. These cisterns are good examples of the 
"honeycombed urban structure" mentioned for example by Roberto Berardi 
as regards Tunis.8 This relative reliance on the domestic sphere caused 
severe hygiene problems, as the engineer Franghia Bey stresses: "the 
dirtiness of the water from the cisterns, particularly high at the end of the 
summer when the water, with lesser volume, developed animalcules in 
prodigious amounts…especially malaria." 
 
b.Community cisterns and ritual baths 
The status of the water reserves owned by religious communities is 
ambiguous because it lies on the borderline between the private and the 
public sphere. In addition, the proximity of these water reserves to religious 
                                                       
6 Pierotti, Ermete, Jerusalem Explored: Being a Description of the Ancient and 
Modern City, London, 1864, vol I, p.63. 
7 Masterman, E.W.G., Hygiene and Diseases in Palestine in Modern and Biblical 
Times, London, undated. 
8 Berardi, Roberto:"Espace et ville", in Chevallier, Dominique (ed) L'espace 
social de la ville arabe, Paris,Edition Paris IV, 1979. 
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sites and places of pilgrimage in Jerusalem often gave them, as though 
through capillary action, a holiness. This is the case for example for the 
famous Probatical Pool located on the French domain of the Church of 
Saint Anne. A pagan holy place with curative virtues, these pools cut into 
the rock were dug in the second century BCE to supply water to the nearly 
Jewish Temple. In a very classic fashion, the Romans adopted this 
tradition by building a temple to the god Seraphis-Asclepius, and the New 
Testament story in John recoups this whole tradition by situating the cure 
of the paraplegic on this site.9 The Byzantines re-utilized the foundations of 
the Roman temple to build a basilica, the Basilica of Saint Mary, whose 
name itself seems to combine all the traditions of the site, since the birth of 
the virgin is now located here as well as the Probatical Pool, where cattle 
were also washed before sacrifices in the Temple. The property was 
granted as an extra-territorial privilege to France by the Sublime Gate in 
1856 at the end of the Crimean War. Renamed "Domaine national de 
Sainte-Anne de Jérusalem", in reference to the mother of Mary, the site 
took on a political value, as is shown by a letter from the Superior of Saint 
Anne to the consul of France on July 12, 1890, at a time when there were 
plans to purchase new strips of land around the domain.10: "This is the only 
way France can own a domain of the highest importance in political, 
territorial, and religious terms in the Holy City and in the immediate vicinity 
of Solomon's Temple." The words of this non-neutral witness need to be 
taken literally to make a geopolitical reading of water in Jerusalem at the 
end of the nineteenth century; for this water, often viewed as holy, is also 
part of the international rivalry for the control of the Holy Places. 
 
c.Pools and Public Fountains 
These are perhaps the most highly visible and yet the least useful forms 
of water storage in Jerusalem. This symbolic visibility and relative 
uselessness for practical purposes is true for both the large open-air public 
pools and for the network of neighborhood fountains. The position of six 
public fountains - the sabil - built by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1536 
testify more to a political will than to a practical concern. They line the 
road used most often by Moslem pilgrims on the way to Haram-El-Cherif. 
Once again, the purpose is to proclaim sovereignty over the Holy City by 
                                                       
9 John, V 2-4 "For the angel of the lord descended at times in the pool and 
moved the water." 
10 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (MAE) Nantes, Série Jérusalem - 
Domaines Nationaux, Saint Anne, V. Letter from Father Federlin to the 
Consul of France Ledoulx, July 12, 1890. Quoted in Trimbur, Dominique, 
"Sainte Anne, lieu de mémoire et lieu de vie français à Jérusalem" forthcoming 
in Chrétiens et Sociétés - XVI°-XX° s., Université Lyon II. 
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water points which are used more for the pilgrims' ritual washing than for 
local domestic consumption. 
The public open-air pools adhere to the same logic. The largest, Sultan's 
Pool, is located directly below Jaffa Gate at the bottom of Hinom Valley. 
All the sources concur that in the nineteenth century these pools were 
almost always empty and only played a very temporary and above all 
symbolic role. After the first heavy rains for instance, the people would 
gather around these pools suddenly filled with water to celebrate the end of 
the dry season. Each would bring his donkey and families would take 
advantage of the opportunity to fill their home cisterns a little more. A few 
early photographs show these gatherings around the collective water points 
and what Rousseau called "la fête autour du puits", highlighting the 
political dimension of the watering hole as  places of sociability and 
exchange. Today located precisely on the dividing line between East and 
West Jerusalem, Sultan's Pool has been drained permanently and 
transformed into a vast amphitheater, and has been used in the last few 
years for performances and concerts which attract the young people of the 
city. The topography of the place suggests a kinship between these places 
of urban sociability over and above their strictly practical usage. 
 
d. The local springs 
Although the private cisterns cover most of the needs for domestic 
hygiene, the local springs (mainly the Gihon spring and Bir Ayub in the 
Kidron valley) provide most of the drinking water, even though eye-witness 
reports tend to be contradictory. The political dimension of the Gihon 
spring stems from the fact that archeologists generally locate the original 
site of Jerusalem around this watering hole, which each of the communities 
in the city attempt very logically to claim as its own. By a classic desire to 
break with Old Testament tradition, the symbolic Christianization of the 
site is achieved by a toponymic shift which plays on the proximity of the 
spring to the tomb of Mary. For the Christians of the city, the Gihon spring 
becomes the spring of the virgin, involving no commitments. Nevertheless 
the political use of the Gihon spring goes far beyond a mere toponymic 
debate. It is known that in December 1867 the British archeologist Charles 
Warren discovered and explored a tunnel measuring 530 meters in length 
which connects the spring to the Silwan pool below, and which made it 
possible to divert the water from the spring which came out outside the 
city, just within the ramparts of the time. This was in fact the guarantee of 
an autonomous water supply for Jerusalem in case of siege. In 1880 
Warren discovered the famous "Silwan inscription" on the walls of the 
tunnel, which commemorate the meeting of the two tunnel digging teams. 
Dated 701 BCE., it helps attribute the first water carrying infrastructure to 
Ezechias, a Jew. Today the precious inscription can be found in the 
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Istanbul museum, but the historical museum of Jerusalem, whose Zionist 
orientation shocked such people such as the former assistant mayor Meron 
Benvenisti, displays a replica to better claim Jewish sovereignty over the 
city by recalling the memory of Ezechias' tunnel.11 In addition, the site itself 
of the tunnel and the Kidron valley are fundamental for the faithful of both 
messianic religions -- Christianity and Judaism. This talweg and this 
topographic confluence are simultaneously a line of contact and a line of 
symbolic confrontation. The original site of the city, it is at the same time 
the connecting point between the Mount of Olives (the place where the 
messiah will come in the Jewish religion, adopted by the gospel stories to 
be the place of Jesus' arrest) and the Temple Mount (site of the apocalyptic 
Last Judgment narrative). The proof is in the recent architectural and 
tourist-oriented use of the site by the Israeli authorities, who are 
attempting to short circuit the Christian axis, which connects the Garden of 
Gethsemane to the Via Dolorosa by a new promenade in stone which 
connects, on the diagonal, the ruins of the Ophel (the city of David) to the 
Jewish cemetery via the superb tomb of the prophet Zachariah. In this 
perspective, the Ezechias tunnel is a subterranean reinforcement for this 
new urban axis. 
 
e. The rural springs 
Extremely low precipitation prevents Jerusalem from becoming self 
sufficient as regards the water supply, even when including water from 
local springs to that of the cisterns within the city proper12. The city has 
always relied on more distant, and authentically rural sources of water 
supply. Solomon's Pools and the aqueduct are one example. Located eleven 
kilometers as the bird flies to the south-west of Jerusalem, on the road 
connecting Bethlehem to Hebron, the three pools of Solomon have a total 
theoretical capacity of over 150,000 cubic meters. The aqueduct connects 
these pools (on the side with an altitude of 768m) to the basins located 
under the Haram-el-Cherif (the lowest point of the city, at 736m). This is 
thus a work of art of great precision, since the total gradient is only 32 
meters for a length of 24 kilometers, which corresponds to scarcely 130 
centimeters per kilometer. In the nineteenth century, water hardly ever 
flowed out of the end of the aqueduct, despite frequent repairs. In his 
report presented to the city in 1894 and published in 1908, the engineer 
                                                       
11 Benvenisti, Meron, Jérusalem, une histoire politique, Solin-Actes Sud, 1996, 
p.11-16. 
12 HAJM, WS, c.614, “Rapport sur l’adduction des eaux d’Arroub”, G. Franghia, 
1908, p.14." The amount of rain in millimeters is on the average for the last 
ten years is 0.636m. It is not less than 0.455m (winter 1887-1888) or more than 
0.958m (winter of 1890-1891)." 
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Franghia comments that these pools "were restored by Izet Pacha, the 
Governor of Jerusalem" and then stresses that "the aqueduct underwent its 
last repair in 1888 which apparently was not very efficient since the aqueduct 
currently doesn't work." 13 In the 1870s, Charles Warren reported that "the 
Solomon aqueduct was repaired with taxpayers' money… the poor fellahin 
were forced to bring their own stones and mortar to the site.."14. This was 
nothing less than forced labor, since the fellahin had to maintain a piece of 
infrastructure which was of no use to them and even deprived them of some 
of the water resources in their immediate environment. This competition 
between city and countryside is confirmed by a tourist guidebook published 
in Hebrew in the 1890s in which the author, Abraham Moses Luncz, 
describes the unsatisfactory repair of the aqueduct in 1866 by the famous 
British philanthropist Montefiore. "Moses Montefiore, who was in Jerusalem 
at the time, donated 300 pounds for this purpose. Nevertheless the 
inhabitants of our city did not enjoy the benefits for long. Water carriers and 
the residents of Bethlehem sabotaged the pipes soon afterwards, because they 
claimed sole ownership of Solomon's pools."15 Bethlehem, which has always 
been a satellite of Jerusalem, thus rejected an infrastructure which crossed 
it underground, and which only served the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the 
provincial capital. The political and social reading of these water conflicts is 
confirmed by a report written by Max Magnus, published in 1909 by the 
Carl Franck Institute of Bremen. To cast doubts on the plan to re-use and 
modernize Solomon's aqueduct, defended by Franghia, the German 
engineer cites the legal claims to the source of the Arub which feeds 
Solomon's Pools: "I was told that the inhabitants of the villages around the 
Ein Arrub spring can need 500 cubic meters per day for themselves. If we 
recognized their rights, it would no longer be possible to provide the city of 
Jerusalem with enough water, even in the beginning…" 16 Use of the classic 
tools of the social sciences - for example the analysis of the conflicting 
interests between the city and its surroundings - enables us to break with 
essentialist historiography which interprets every conflict in Jerusalem 
primarily as a war of religion or a conflict between communities. 
 
II. The era of engineers and entrepreneurs: towards a political 
history of decision-making 
The shaky balance between the multiple water resources and the still 
limited demands collapsed at the turn of the century. The population of 
                                                       
13 HAJM, WS, c.614, Franghia, 1908, p.20. 
14 Warren, Charles, Underground Jerusalem, 1876, p.441 
15 Luncz, A.M., Guide of Eretz Israel and Syria, p.131. 
16 HAJM, c. 614, Rapport sur l'alimentation de Jérusalem en eau, M. Magnus, 
1909, p.7. 
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Jerusalem went from 10,000 inhabitants in about 1850 to 70,000 at 
about 1910, which increased basic water requirements from 300 cubic 
meters per day to more than 2000. At the start of the century, the 
engineers submitted water carrying plans which could provide 2000 cubic 
meters daily and in the future up to 5000 cubic meters to the city. Two-
thirds of the sharp increase in the population of Jerusalem can be 
attributed to Zionist immigration. Whereas the three communities had 
about 4000 people in about 1850, the Jewish population of the city rose 
from 4000 to almost 40,000. At the same time the Christian and Moslems 
in the city each doubled their population, from 4000 to 10,000 each. 
However beyond the stakes raised by the Zionist project, analysis of 
previous failed attempts at modernization should lead to consideration of 
the abilities of the Ottoman administration to modernize, the various 
levels of provincial and municipal powers, in short to a political history of 
expertise and decision-making. In Jerusalem, the vulgate historiography 
concluded years ago that the Ottoman rulers were incapable of modernizing 
the urban networks. The colonialist ideology of the British mandate 
combined with the Zionist discourse to reject the image of the Ottoman 
period as a modernizing enterprise.17 This is the condescending image of an 
"immobile and complicated East", the "long slumber of Jerusalem" from 
1517 to 1917, and the overblown contrast between the impotence of the 
Ottoman administration and the golden age of Solomon's rule. If control 
over water, since the civilizations of High Egypt up to medieval Venice, has 
indeed always been the incontrovertible sign of political efficiency, Ottoman 
incompetence to satisfy the water supply needs of the Holy City would 
confirm its structural backwardness. It should however be pointed out that 
the situation never became catastrophic. The flexibility of the traditional 
systems always made it possible to respond to emergencies. This empirical 
adaptation did not impede a desire for a complete modernization of the 
system, as the technical projects preserved in the municipal archives show. 
 
a.Evaluating the needs and defining a market 
The first step in drawing up a plan for water supply is to conduct a 
financial feasibility study, which presupposes an evaluation of the needs of 
the population, in order to plan for the scope of a lucrative market. 
Engineer Franghia discusses the consumption figures for water of several 
large cities in the world (30 liters per inhabitant and per day in Barcelona, 
                                                       
17 This is even true for an illustrious representative of the "new Israeli history" 
Tom Segev, in C’était en Palestine au temps des coquelicots, (original title: Yemei 
Ha Kalaniot), Liana Levi, 2000, p.7: "Palestine was under Ottoman rule. It was a 
distant province, without laws or administration. Life unfolded in slow motion, 
in the bind of tradition and at a camel's pace." 
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50 liters in Cairo, 80 liters in Alexandria, 215 liters in Paris) before 
concluding the following for Jerusalem. "35 to 40 liters of very pure spring 
water per day, in addition to the water captured in the cisterns is amply 
sufficient to place the city within the ranks of happy towns."18 Although this 
estimate appears to be basically sound, (roughly 3000 liters per day in 
1910) it does not differentiate drinking water, which is the basis for the 
water market at the Mugrabim Gate, from water destined for domestic use 
that stagnates in the private cisterns. This differentiation raises the issue 
of the discrepancy between the assessment of needs and the evaluation of 
the potential market. The German Max Magnus stressed this feature of 
Jerusalem in 1909 as follows: "The water needed for household use is drawn 
from cisterns and a small quantity of drinking water is brought from the 
springs around the city,  which can only be evaluated as up to 1.5 to 2 liters 
a day per capita and per day. By installing a conduit in Jerusalem it must 
be taken into account that the inhabitants, who already have cisterns in 
their houses, will not buy water from the pipes unless their cisterns are 
empty."19  He estimated the initial need per inhabitant at a little more 
than 10 liters, which suggests a market of 1000 cubic meters per day 
maximum. This doubt as regards the financial viability of the plan was 
apparently decisive in determining the Zionist strategy in obtaining the 
concession for the water market. In a confidential report preserved in the 
Zionist Central Archives, it is stressed that "the water market as a separate 
project should not be expected to generate large profits,"  and that the only 
way to amortize the investment was to link the water concession to 
electricity20. The report develops the same arguments as those made by 
Max Magnus, stressing that the inhabitants of Jerusalem "will be slow to 
replace their cisterns by subscribing to a water supply network. By setting the 
price of the cubic meter at 70 or 80 cents, we can expect an immediate sale of 
1000 cubic meters per day, and in the long term, this amount should increase 
up to 1700 cubic meters per day." The pessimistic estimate of needs and 
the definition of the water market apparently seem to generate a form of 
capitalist overbidding in Jerusalem. This overbidding would in fact guide 
the technical debates concerning the choice of springs. 
 
b.Drawing up plans and disseminating information 
The political history of the technical networks can also be revealed by 
analysis of the networks of dissemination of information and the study of 
lobbies in favor of the various projects. Between 1908 and 1910 there was 
a recrudescence of these proposals which apparently responded to a 
                                                       
18 HAJM, WS, c. 614, Franghia, 1908, p.12. 
19 HAJM, WS, c. 614, Magnus, 1909, p.4. 
20 CZA, Z.2. f. 642 November 1910. 
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renewed political demand on the part of the municipality. This resurgence 
of interest reached its peak with the publication of the Franghia report in 
1908, and the Magnus report in 1909, and finally with the official 
publication of a tender by the Municipality in August 1910. The proposal 
presented by Engineer Franghia, the President of the Technical corps of the 
Engineering school of Constantinople, head of public works in Palestine, 
was to divert the sources of the Arub and to modernize Solomon's aqueduct 
in order to take greater advantage of the gradient to bring 2000 cubic 
meters of water per day to Jerusalem. Mgr. Damianos, the Patriarch of the 
Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem, who "believed he was rendering service 
to the city of Jerusalem… authorized the printing, free of charge, of this 
study, on the printing presses of the Greek Convent of Saint Sepulchre" 
underscores further the political implications of the proposal.21 In fact it 
appears that the Franghia report was already obsolete when it was 
published, because the rise in domestic needs was more rapid than the 
drawing up and dissemination of the technical proposal. Other sources 
indicate that Franghia in fact began his study as early as 1889, and that 
the proposal he decided to have published in 1908 was identical to the one 
he had proposed to the municipality in 1894. This explains the ease with 
which the German engineer Max Magnus could refute Franghia's 
arguments. In a report published in November 1909, the director of the 
Carl Franck Institute of Bremen challenged the feasibility of the plan to 
deviate the source of the Arub and argues in favor of deviating the spring at 
Ein Fara, located 13 kilometers north of Jerusalem. The geographical 
location of the Ein Fara spring, 500 meters lower in altitude than 
Jerusalem, would require building electric pumps to carry the water to the 
Holy City, which implied a total budget of four million francs, double what 
the Franghia plan would have cost (which was apparently 
underestimated). Neither project was ever carried out because of lack of 
funding, and the analysis of these plans would be of limited interest and 
merely scholarly if the confidential report by the Zionist organizations had 
not referred to it.22 This report, dated November 1910, emanates from 
Jacob H. Kann, a member of the Interior Committee of the Zionist 
Organization, director at the Jewish Colonial Trust bank, and follows up 
on a report by the Dutch engineer Meyer, sent to Jerusalem by the Zionist 
Executive Committee at the beginning of 1910. By comparing this report to 
other sources, it emerges that the Carl Franck Institute negotiated the 
writing of a plan at the start of 1909 with Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the director 
of the Palestine Bureau of the Zionist Organization in which Jewish funds 
would be mobilized. Apparently no agreement was reached and the August 
                                                       
21 HAJM, WS, c. 614, Franghia, 1908, p.3. 
22 CZA, Z.2. f.642, J.H. Kann, November 1910. 
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1910 tender once again launched the competition. In his report, Jacob H. 
Kann presents economic and political arguments in favor of involving 
Jewish banks in the water supply project in Jerusalem. The economic 
argument attempts to show that the water supply concession in 
Jerusalem, if it helps in the awarding of other contracts, such as electricity 
supply or the tramways could be profitable or at least viable financially 
because it would take benefit from the jumpstart to the Ottoman economy. 
The argument is primarily political, since Jacob Kann stresses that the 
success of the plan would help encourage Zionist immigration not only from 
the European lower classes but also from the 'cultivated classes': "The 
water supply to Jerusalem is an important issue because it would contribute 
to a great extent to the improvement of the social conditions and conditions of 
hygiene which to this date are an obstacle to the settlement of immigrants 
from the cultivated classes of European society who are used to a better 
standard of living." 23This highly political dimension of the history of 
technical networks in Jerusalem or elsewhere is hence nothing more than 
an exaggerated reading a posteriori by the historian. It is an obvious reality 
for the players in these conflicts, well aware of distributing water as well 
as governance through the underground networks. 
 
3.The 1914 agreement: an unfinished story 
The August 1910 tender, whose deadline was set for October 15, never 
resulted in any decision by the municipality. The solution to the problem 
appeared however to be imminent in the final days of the Ottoman period, 
at the start of the year 1914. On February 14, an 'agreement concerning 
the concession for the building and operation of the supply of drinking 
water to the city of Jerusalem' was signed. The bidder awarded the 
contract was an Ottoman citizen, Euripide Mavrommatis, living in Galata, 
in the modern districts of Istanbul. His name can also be found in 1926, 
during negotiations for the awarding of a concession for the supply of 
electricity to Jerusalem.24   In the municipal archives, a document dated 
October 14, 1926 expresses concern over the difficulties of this same 
Euripide Mavrommatis in his management of work at the Ein Fara 
spring.25 One thing is clear: although the War interrupted the concession 
signed in 1914, it did not prevent Mavrommatis from achieving his goals 
                                                       
23 HAJM, WS, c. 614, February 14, 1914. 
24 Jewish National University Library (JNUL), JL-GF, in 2, Agreement as to 
Electricity Concession in Jerusalem - The Crown Agents for the Colonies and 
Euripide Mavrommatis, Westminster, 1926. See also Aran, Michael, "The 
Mavrommatis Affair: The Electric Power Concession in Jerusalem" Cathedra, For 
this history of Eretz-Israel and its Yeshuv, 44 (1987), p.191-197. 
25 HAJM, WS, c.615, "Jerusalem Water Concession," October 14, 1926. 
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under the Mandate. The history of the water supply to Jerusalem at the 
end of the Ottoman Empire is clearly a chronicle of delays and failures, but 
the ensuing events show at least that the final plan, adopted in 1914, was 
viable. This February 1914 agreement must be read as a summary of the 
previous fifty years as well as the introduction of the Mandate period. 
The 1914 agreement serves to confirm the relevance of the traditional 
forms of water supply mentioned earlier. Article 2 specifies that "The 
contractor will have no rights whatsoever to impede the use of currently 
existing cistern water or wells or prevent the construction by the city or by 
individuals for purposes of free supply; as well as free use, as in the past, of 
water outlets in the city of Jerusalem brought by pipes, or the sale of water in 
barrels, bottles or other means as in the past." The municipal engineers and 
experts thus implicitly acknowledged the existence of parallel distribution 
networks, the logic of barter and gift-giving, and the complex social customs 
which had long governed the sharing and circulation of water in the city. 
This acknowledgement is also a rejection of an absolute monopoly and 
total commercialization: water in Jerusalem cannot be reduced to a simple 
commodity. As regards the Franghia plan or the Magnus plan the 
agreement does not make a choice: but stipulates municipal consultative 
powers, as indicated in article 3: "The contractor is asked to draw up two 
plans, so that the Administration can choose one with the agreement of the 
contractor. One involves the Arub springs located south of Jerusalem and are 
described in the preliminary plan drawn up by the municipality in 1894, the 
other involves the springs at Ein Fara and Ein Fawar, located north of the 
city and taken into consideration by other writers. The contractor may also 
present any other plan he wishes. In case of disagreement between the city 
and the contractor as to which plan to select, the Ministry of Public Works 
will make the final choice".26 The supposition that the Magnus plan was 
supported by outside parties and the Franghia plan by the local and 
municipal authorities appears to be validated. In any case, this is a far 
throw from the classic image of a 'remote province, without law or 
administration',27 and apparently control over the affair by various levels of 
Ottoman power (from the municipality to the governor to the Ministry of 
Public Works) indeed occurred when the agreement was signed. The desire 
to compromise between a market strategy and the operation of a public 
service can be seen in article 11, where it is specified that the contractor 
must install and maintain 20 public fountains whose flow will be deducted 
from the 350 cubic meters provided every day to the city free of charge. The 
same article specifies that fifteen of these fountains will be "operational 
water points" whereas the five others will be "decorative," and that they 
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'will be situated at locations designated by the City' as though to 
emphasize that the water points are still, at the turn of the century, as 
much anchor points as points of authority.28 
 
Thus in the final months of the Empire, the same stakes and the same 
concerns can be found as those existing several decades previously: water 
remains a political issue, the public fountains are still a symbolic symbol 
and a material base for authority, and the underground water networks 
are still networks of power. This chronological permeability and this 
restatement of issues stresses the importance of the inheritances, the 
patching over and re-uses involved in territorial strategies in Jerusalem. A 
rapid overview of the situation today seems to confirm this intuition, at a 
time when the smallest defensive position, and the smallest 'stronghold' 
from the Golan heights to the Jordan valley settlements, is simultaneously 
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